Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1966

Ruth Marks v. Continental Casualty Co. : Brief of
Appellant

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Hanson & Baldwin and Rex J. Hanson; Attorneys for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Marks v. Continental Casualty, No. 10656 (1966).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3870

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE________________________

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ----------------------------

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL --------------------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT ----------------------------------------------------------------------

9

POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF DEFRAUDED
THE DEFENDANT IN OBTAINING INSURANCE COVERAGE. ------------------------------------------------

9

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING

THA'T

MRS.

MARKS'

MEDICAL

PROBLEM COMMENCED PRIOR TO THIRTY
DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE
POLICY. ----------------------------------------------------------------------

19

CONCLUSION--------------------------------------------------------------------

23

CASES CITED

Castagno v. Occidental Life Insurance Company, 151
F. Supp. 781 (D.C. Utah 1957) ______________________________ 9, 13
Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 54
Utah 443, 181 Pac. 448 --------------------------------------------

11

Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 56
Utah 480, 191 Pac. 240 --------------------------------------------

18

Moore v. D.&.R.G. Western R.R. Company, 4 Utah 2d
255, 292 P.2d 849 (1956) ----------------------------------------

21

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
Page
New York Life Insurance v. Grow, 103 Utah 285, 135
P.2d 130 (1943) --------------------------------------- ______________ l 7, 18
Theros v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 17
Utah 2d 205, 407 P.2d 685 (1965) __________________ _____

15

Wootton v. Combined Insurance Company of America,
16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 ( 1964) ____________________ 16, 17
Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assurance, 97 F.2d 583
(10th Cir. 1938) ____________________________________________________ 10, 17
Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assurance, 108 F.2d 902
(10th Cir. 1940) ______________________________________________________ 10, 18

TEXTS
Laws of Utah, 1947, Chapter 63, Section 2 ________________

11

Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Volume 1,
Sections 248, 254 ------------------------------------------------------

14

Haynes, The Diagnosis of Disc Injuries, 1 Lawyers
Medical Journal 1, 5 ( 1965) ------------------------------------

22

STA'TUTES
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 31-19-8 ______________ 10, 19

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RUTH MARKS,
Plaintif!-Respondent,
vs.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY

co.,

Case No.
9785

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Continental Casualty Company,
appeals from a decision of the District Court of
Salt Lake County, Stewart H. Hanson, Judge, granting to respondent a judgment in the sum of $1,783.70
on a claim that she was covered by hospitalization
and surgical insurance policies issued by the appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respondent filed suit against appellant on
November 13, 1964 contending that she was entitled
to compensation under two policies issued by appel1

Ian t covering medical expenses she incurred for a
lumbar disc fusion of her back. The appellant denied coverage on the grounds of misrepresentation
in the insurance application on each policy and on
the grounds the operations arose as the result of a
pre-insuring condition. Trial was held without jury
on March 30, 1966 before the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, Judge. Judgment was rendered for
respondent. A motion for a new trial was made and
denied and appellant prosecuted this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant contends that the decision of the
trial court should be reversed and judgment entered
dismissing the respondent's action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant submits the following statement
of facts.
Respondent in her complaint alleged that the
appellant had issued to her two insurance policies
(nos. 31381609, 31381610) entitling her to insurance benefits as a result of back surgery she had on
April 5, 1964. (R. 1) Appellant admitted the issuance of the policies and the surgery that respondent,
Mrs. Ruth Marks, had had performed but denied
the coverage of the policies and alleged misrepresentation on her part and a pre-existing condition.
(R. 2, 3-4)
2

Mrs. Marks testified that she resided in Salt
Lake City and that the policies in question had been
paid for by her former husband. ( R. 25) Exhibits
P-1 and P-2 are two insurance policies issued by the
appellant to the respondent. P-1 covered medical
and surgical expense and P-2 hospitalization. Both
policies were issued effective May 27, 1963.
Mrs. Marks testified on direct examination
that the information on the application accompanying exhibit P-1 indicating she nor her dependents
had ever been treated for "arthritis, rheumatism,
back, spine, bone, joint or muscle disorder" was a
correct answer. The same answer was made with
reference to a similar application accompanying
exhibit P-2. It was admitted that the policies were
in effect on April 4, 1964 at the time respondent
underwent surgery for her back. Mrs. Marks did
sustain medical expense as a result of the surgery
in the sum $1,614.21. (R. 28, Exh. P-4)
The respondent had also refunded the premium
checks given for the policies and rejected Mrs.
Mar ks claim. ( R. 28)
Mrs. Marks testified that she did not fill out
the application for the policies, that this was apparently done by her brother-in-law, Mr. Borofsky.
(R. 29) She stated Borofsky was an agent working
for the Harry Magoon Agency, in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
( R. 30) The policies were placed with the Magoon
Agency. She testified that she signed only one ap3

plication and it was signed in blank. (R. 29) At
the time of trial the applications accompanying exhibits P-1 and P-2 were received in evidence and
they were filled out and a signature purporting to
be that of Mrs. Marks was on each application. Respondent denied the signature on one application
was hers (Exh. P-1, R. 33) and assumed it was
Borofsky who signed her name. She claimed she
did not authorize him to sign her name. (R. 45, 46)
She did admit signing the application P-2 which
she said was sent to her, and was the only application she received. ( R. 33) She also denied receiving
a letter from the Magoon Agency asking her to fill
out the two applications and a doctor's authorization statement. (R. 34) Exhibit D-6 was received
and was a letter addressed to Mrs. Marks from
Harry B. Magoon purporting to forward two applications and doctor's statement. The letter admonished respondent to give careful attention to the
questions in the applications, and return the documents. The letter expressly stated:
If there has been any medical history on your

children, please specify the doctors name on
the 'Physicians Form.' (Exhibit D-6)
Mrs. Marks testified that on receipt of the policies
she did not examine the applications which were
attached to the policies. (R. 34, 35)
Mrs. Marks, on cross-examination, admitted
that, prior to the applications and the effective date
of the policies, in 1958, she had been in an auto4

mobile accident which "severed nerves" in her arm
and she had no control of her wrist. (R. 36) Sections 10 B of both policies had negative indications
as to paralysis and 10 F was also negative as to
joint and bone disorders. (Exh. P-1, 2) She went
into the hospital in 1958 for treatment of the injury. (R. 37) Exhibit D-7 was admitted which was
a surgical report made to the Utah State Industrial
Commission. In section 2 of the report on the nature
and extent of the injuries the following was noted:
Crushing injury to left arm, mid portion
with puncture wound, hematoma formation
and partial nerve paralysis of median, ulnar
and radial nerves.
Mrs. Marks also admitted on cross-examination
that in 1954 she underwent a coccygectomy and her
coccyx was removed. ( R. 30) She testified she wrote
a letter to Borofsky in which she disclosed the coccygectomy in 1954. (R. 30) She did not have a copy
of the letter and none was produced at trial. She
also admitted sustaining a "severe fall" in 1955 for
which she was treated for radiating pain down both
legs. ( R. 38) She testified she was treated by Drs.
Lamb and Chapman. She remembered seeing Dr.
Lamb and telling him she had pain in the lower
back and both legs. ( R. 40).
Respondent on her admission to the hospital
in April, 1964, gave her medical history to an intern. (R. 40) She told the intern she had intermit5

tent low back pain for the past nine years. (R.
40-41 Exh. 1 medical records) She had been treated
in 1955 by Dr. Lamb and Dr. Chapman.
On redirect examination Mrs. Marks testified
she had no back disorder when she applied for the
policy and hadn't had any subsequent to her hospitalization in 1957 as a result of the automobile
accident. She testified that she could not recall if
she had low back pain when she saw Dr. Chapman
in July, 1955, but felt the only pain she had was in
the area of where the coccyx had been.
The depositions of Mr. Harry B. Magoon and
Dr. Robert Lamb were published and received. (1)
Mr. Magoon testified that he was an independent
general insurance agent doing business as Magoon
Associates Inc. and represented several companies.
(M 3) His offices were in Tulsa, Oklahoma. One
of the companies he represents is the defendant. (M
4) He indicated applications were sent to Mrs.
Marks on a suggestion from Jerry Borofsky, Mrs.
Marks' brother-in-law. (M 4,5) The arrangements
for payment premiums and initial suggestions for
insurance were apparently made by Mrs. Marks'
former husband. Mr. Magoon never talked to him.
He in di ca ted he sent a letter to Mrs. Marks ( Exh.
D-6) along with the applications and an attending
doctor's statement. ( M 6) He believed Mrs. Marks
( 1) The record of the Magoon deposition will be refened to
as (1\1-). The Lamb record of the deposition will be refened to
as (L-).
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returned the applications. He said a signature on
the applications was absolutely necessary to issuance of the policy as was completion of the applications. He indicated that if there had been any indication of a medical problem he would not have
processed the applications with the doctor's statement. (M 10) He was under an assumption Mrs.
Marks had signed both applications, he had not seen
the application after return when it was not completed. The signature on both policy applications
is almot identical, and it is doubtful if anyone but
an expert could tell the difference if in fact the
signature was not Mrs. Marks. No other correspondence was received from Mrs. Marks. (M 16).
All checkmarks in the application column were
marked '·'no." Mr. Magoon said if back trouble had
been marked it would have been a "red flag." (M
19) He stated a back disorder would have to have
been checked out before the policies would have been
sent to the company. (M 20) The home office issued
all policies. ( M 20) Mr. Magoon knew of no correspondence betwen Borofsky and Mrs. Marks. Borof sky was not a licensed agent at the time, but had
applied. No special consideration was given to relatives ( M 35), and he knew Borofsky and Mrs.
Marks were related. (M 33) Mr. Magoon was of
the opinion that Borofsky was not to be trusted.
(M 39)
7

Applications are examined by the company's
underwriting department before being issued. (M
38) The issuance of the policy under these circumstances would have violated company rules. (M 41)
Dr. Robert Lamb testified that he was an orthopedic surgeon and first saw Mrs. Marks on July
26, 1955. Dr. Chapman saw her July 21, 1955.
( L 2,3) The medical records on Mrs. Marks showed
she was treated for low back pain radiating into
both legs. He diagnosed her condition as evidencing
definite nerve root pressure. (L 5) He did not see
Mrs. Marks until 1964 when he did a myelograrn
and determined to operate. (L 7) The operation disclosed a protruding disc, and a pathological examination disclosed a degenerated fibrocartilage. (L
7) Dr. Lamb was of the opinion, based on the medical history, that there was a probable connection
between the 1955 fall and treatment and the 1964
operation, especially in view of the intermittent
back pain. ( L 7, 8) He also was of the opinion the
fall in 1955 probably had a causative relationship.
(L 11, 12)
Mrs. Marks had indicated the operation was
a consumation of the fall nine years prior. She stated in response to the following question:
Question: You subsequently went to the hospital for an operation to correct a defect
in the lumbar spinal column or the lower
part of your back?
Answer: Nine years later, I guess.
8

Based on the above evidence the court found for
Mrs. Marks, and found no intention on the part of
the plaintiff to deceive or defraud, that there was
no connection between the 1955 fall and treatment
and the 1964 operation. The court further found
the 1955 treatment and injury and the 1954 operation were not incidents that increased the hazard
"for which defndant issued its policies." (R 10)
Judgment was rendered for respondent.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT PLAINTIFF DEFRAUDED THE DEFENDANT
IN OBTAINING INSURANCE COVERAGE.

The appellant submits the trial court committed error in failing to determine that plaintiff obtained insurance coverage by material misrepresentation. In urging its position on appeal appellant is aware of the necessity of viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
decision. Even so, appellant submits the evidence
overwhelmingly demonstrates that respondent should
have been denied recovery.
In Castagna v. Occidental Life Insurance Co.,
151 F. Supp. 781 (D.C. Utah 1957) Judge Christensen, applying Utah law in a similar case observed:
Verdicts may not be permitted to rest u~on
mere conjecture and where proven facts give
9

equal support to each of two inconsistent inferences, judgment as a matter of law must
go against the party having the burden of
proof (citing case). There is a presumption
of intent to deceive from the knowing concealment of material facts unless such presumption is overthrown by substantial evi- '
dence. Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
of United States, 10 Cir., 1938, 97 F.2d 583,
see also Id., 10 Cir., 108 F.2d 902. The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove lack of an
intent to deceive on the part of the insured.
31-19-8, U.C.A., 1953 relating to representations in applications for insurance now reads:
( 1) All statements and descriptions in any
application for an insurance policy or annuity contract, or for the reinstatement or renewal thereof, by or in behalf of the insured
or annuitant, shall be deemed to be representations and not warranties. Misrepresentations,
omissions, concealment of facts, and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery
under the policy or contract unless:
(a)

fraudulent; or

(b) material either to the acceptance
of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by
the insurer ; or
( c) the insurer in good faith either
would not have issued the policy or contract, or would not have issued, reinstated or renewed it at the same premium rate, or would not have issued, reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract
in as large an amount, or would not have
10

provided coverage with respect to the
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true
facts had been made known to the insurer
as required either by the application for
the policy or contract or otherwise.
( 2) If, in any action to rescind any policy
or con tract or to recover thereon, any misrepresentation with respect to a medical impairment is proved by the insurer, and the
insured or any other person having or claiming a right under the contract shall prevent
full disclosure and proof of the nature of
the medical impairment, the misrepresentation shall be presumed to have been material.
Thus any material misrepresentation relating
should be presumed to have been material. The requirement of fraud is similar to the same requirement existing under prior laws, Laws of Utah 1947,
Ch. 63, Sec. 2; Chadwick v. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 54
Utah 443, 181 Pac. 448. The present statute became effective July 1, 1963. Thus, the above section
became effective subsequent to the issuance of the
policies in question. The statute in effect before
(Laws of Utah 1947, Ch. 63, Sec. 2) read:
( 1) Except as provided in subsection
( 2) , no oral or written misrepresen ta tion or
warranty made in the negotiation of an insurance contract, by the insured or in his behalf shall be deemed material or defeat or
avoid the contract or prevent it attaching,
unless such misrepresentation or warranty is
made with the intent to deceive.
11

The insured shall have the burden of
proof that such misrepresentation or warranty was not made with intent to deceive.
(2) In any application for life or disability insurance made in writing by the insured, all statements therein made by the insured shall, in the absence of fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties. The
falsity of any such statement shall not bar
the right to recovery under the contract unless it materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by
the insurer.
Appellant submits from a substantive point
of view it is relatively immaterial which statute
applies, but submits respondent still has the burden
to prove lack of an intent to deceive.

The facts in this case show two applications
for insurance. Both bear the purported signatures
of Mrs. Marks. Although she testified she only
signed one of the applications, the signatures rather
appear to be of the same hand. Both applications
indicated that the respondent had never suffered
or sustained any back injury, or had any back
trouble. The evidence clearly showed Mrs. Marks
had a coccygectomy in 1954, sustained a severe fall
in 1955, and had intermittent back pain subsequently. The failure to disclose this matter in the ,
applications was obviously an intentional misrepresentation amounting to fraud. Although Mrs. Marks
testified that she signed the application in blank,
12

the more probable truth is that there was a scheme
between herself and her brother-in-law, Borofsky,
not to disclose the prior problem. Mrs. Marks said
she sent a letter to Borofsky, which was not produced at trial, in which she disclosed the prior operation. However, she did not testify that the letter
disclosed the fall and treatment, nor the intermittent pain, nor finally the paralysis to her wrist as
a result of the automobile accident in 1957. The
latter failure to disclose also indicates an intent to
deceive because of the negative markings in the
appropriate area on the policy applications.
The affirmative evidence on the part of appellant showed a letter was sent to Mrs. Marks expressly directing her to fill out the applications,
note medical histories, and return the applications
with the doctor's statement. It is submitted the evidence before the trial court did not overcome the
presumption of the intent to deceive nor sustain
her burden of proof.
In Castagno v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra,
the court overturned a jury verdict for plaintiff.
The case shows facts indistinguishable in principle
from those of the instant case. The deceased had
failed to properly disclose material health problems
in an insurance application. There had been some
disclosure to the selling agent but not to the physician (cit. p. 783). The court held this was insufficient to sustain the burden and granted a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
13

In Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Vol.
1 Sec. 248 it is stated:
The failure of the insured to fill in any
blank demanding information as to medical
attendance amounts to a positive statement
that none have been rendered, and concealment of any treatments of consequence is
held fraudulent.
And further, Sec. 254
It has frequently happened that the applicant mentions certain treatments which
have been rendered him but fails to include
certain others, or that he gives the name of
certain attending physicians but fails to give
the names of others.
In such event where the insured denies
having received medical attention from other
than certain named physicians, such a representation is usually deemed material to the
:isk, so as to avoid liability on the part of the
msurer.
Appelman would seem to clearly support a conclusion that even if Mrs. Marks disclosed her operation the failure to disclose other medical problems
would preclude recovery.

Further, Mrs. Marks can gain nothing by her
claim that she signed one application in blank. In
so doing she was aware of her aiding a non-disclosure and obviously intended the application to
be filled in in any manner Borofsky felt proper. In
14

Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 17 Utah 2d
205, 407 P.2d 685 ( 1965) this court observed:

Upon the record, and plaintiff does not
contend otherwise, it appears that the answers contained in the application were untrue; they were material to the risk; the defendant believed and relied upon them; and
the defendant, being deceived by them, would
not have issued the policy had it known the
truth - at least, not without a medical examination.
The appellant's contention was that the proper
answers had been given by the insured but not proparly recorded by the agent. The applicant had signed the policy. The court went on to observe:
In order to defeat recovery on an insurance policy because of misrepresentation in
the application, the misrepresentations must
have been made with an intent to deceive
and defraud the insurance company. However, such an intent may be inferred where
the applicant knowingly misrepresents facts
which he knows would influence the insurer
in accepting or rejecting the risk. The same
rule should apply where the applicant knowingly, or with constructive knowledge, permits such misrepresentations to be submitted
to the insurance company.

*

*

*

It is also the majority rule that an in-

sured is under a duty to read his application
before signing it, and will be considered bound
by a knowledge of the contents of his signed
application. This is merely an application of
15

fundamental contract law. While courts generally are inclined to treat insurance contracts
as special and do not always vigorously apply
all the principles of contract law, that tendency should not be allowed to overrun the
bounds of legitimate exception.
The facts here presented provide absolutely no basis for applying any exception to
the basic contract law. The record is devoid
of any facts or circumstances that would indicate or imply that Theros was by fraud,
accident, misrepresentation, imposition, illiteracy, artifice or device reasonably prevented from reading the application before signing it. Therefore, he is, by law, conclusively
presumed to have read the application and
his beneficiary is bound by the contents thereof. It therefore follows that the lower court
should be affirmed.
Apart from the trial court's memorandum decision rejecting the application of the above case,
the logic of the case seems controlling and decisive
of this appeal.
The case of Wootton v. Combined Ins. Co. of
America, 16 Utah 2d 52, 395 P.2d 724 ( 1964) found
controlling by the trial court is not precedent to
sustain the trial court's award. In that case the
answers on the application were not directly false
as they are in the instant case. A direct disclosure
of the full condition of deceased was made, not so
in this case. The only issue in Wootton was intent,
and the court observed:
The failure of respondent to volunteer
the information that her husband had re16

signed his job in July because with the added
work his weak leg was being adversely affected cannot reasonably be considered as sufficient evidence upon which to base a finding of intent to defraud. Appellant had sufficient knowledge of the physical disability of
respondent's husband to ascertain all the facts
it needed as to its extent, if it had deemed it
important, by either asking further questions
or conducting an investigation; and it cannot
blind itself from ascertaining the truth and
then claim wilful misrepresentation of the
truth on which it relied in order to avoid payment under a policy. This would appear to be
especially applicable in the instant case where
the accidental death of respondent's husband
was not in any way related to his physical
defect.
A reading of the case discloses its inapplicability to the instant appeal. The Wootton case is
similar to New York Life Ins. v. Grow, 103 Utah,
285, 135 P.2d 130 ( 1943) where this court sustained
a jury's verdict for the insured, finding the answers in the application ambiguous and, therefore,
capable of being found not to have been made with
an intent to deceive. In this case the answers were
unambiguous and false.
In Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assitr., 97 F.2d
583 (10th Cir. 1938), the court had a life insurance
claim, which required the application of Utah law.
The court said:
A misrepresentation will not constitute
a defense to an action on a policy of insur17

ance unless it was intentionally untrue or
made with a reckless disregard for its truth
or falsity. Where an insured knowingly makes
a material misrepresentation, proof of an actual, conscious purpose to deceive is not necessary.
This language was approved by the Utah Supreme Court in the Grow case. In the subsequent
Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Asur. case, 108 F.2d
902 (10th Cir. 1940), the 10th Cir. approved the
following language from the second Chadwick case,
56 Utah 480, 191 Pac. 240:
If the insured at the time of making his
application for a policy has knowledge or
good reason to know that he is afflicted with
a disease that renders his condition serious,
and that thereby his longevity will be prejudicially impaired, his statements and representations to the contrary in reply to specific
inquiries constitute a fraud practiced upon
the insurer, and which, when successfully
proven, invalidates the policy.
The second Zolintakis case then concludes:

By this decision Utah is committed to
the liberal doctrine that before misrepresentations of material facts will void a policy of
insurance it must be established that they
were not only knowingly made but also wilfully and intentionally, with intent to deceive
and defraud.

*

*

*

The court then goes on to explain :
One cannot knowingly conceal or misrepresent facts which one knows would in18

fluence the risk or the issuance of the policy,
and then be heard to say that he did not intend to deceive or defraud.
The above cases support judgment for the appellant since respondent lent herself to at least a
constructive misrepresentation and did so intentionally.
The trial court's finding that if there was any
failure to disclose it did not increase the hazard is
equally erroneous. First, the only testimony on the
issue, except an objectionable opinion from Mrs.
Mars, was Mr. Magoon's testimony that back problems are "red flag." Second, the finding is immaterial since that issue was of no consequence under
the law in existence at the time the policies were
issued. Finally, 31-19-8, U.C.A., 1953 presumes a
failure to disclose medical information in policies
like those in question is material. Consequently, the
court's findings do not sustain the judgment. This
court should reverse.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT MRS. MARKS' MEDICAL PROBLEM COMMENCED PRIOR TO THIRTY DAYS FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE POLICY.

The two policies issued by the appellant to
Mrs. Marks both contained provisions to the effect
that no sickness or injury was covered which commenced prior to thirty days after the policy had
19

been in force ( Exh. P-1, P-2). Consequently, if Mrs.
Marks was operated on for a condition that had its
inception prior to the 30 day period subsequent to
the effective date of the policy, the defendant should
have prevailed.
Appellant realizes that in appraising the evidence on appeal it must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. Appellant submits,
however, that even when the evidence is so examined there is no reasonable basis for the judgment
in favor of the respondent.
The effective date of the policies was May 27,
1963. It was undisputed that respondent underwent
a coccygectomy in 1954. It was equally undisputed
that Mrs. Marks sustained a "severe fall" in 1955
and sought orthopedic assistance. Medical records
of the treating physicians showed low back pain
radiating into both legs. Sensitivity was noticed in
the lumbosacral region and the sacrum. Diagnosis
on the last visit in 1955 was of for "consideration
of excision of protruded intervertebral disc and a
fusion." Mrs. Marks never went back for further
treatment. On admittance to the hospital for the
operation giving rise to the instant case, she advised
the intern who took her history that nine years
prior she had a severe fall landing on her buttocks. The intern noted, "Since that time she has intermittent low back pain, sometimes so severe she
cannot get out of bed." The correctness of the in20

formation given the intern was verified at trial
except she denied she hadn't been able to get out of
bed for 4¥2 months before the operation. ( R. 42).
On redirect examination by her attorney she
said she had no pain in her back after 1957. She
also testified that the location of the pain was in
the area of where the coccyx had been ( R. 55).
Dr. Lamb gave his opinion as follows:
If I might stipulate a little further, that
in view of the fact that she stated that she
had had continued symptoms since that time,
there would possibly, probably be a connection between that and her present condition
insofar as her symptoms had been recurrent
intermittently since then.

Dr. Lamb also testified that the operation showed
a degenerated fibrocartilage condition (L 8).
It is submitted on the basis of this evidence
the standard of probability set out in Moore v. D.
& R. G. W. R. R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849
( 1956), the only believable evidence and the only
expert, scientific evidence offered showed the operation was performed as a result of a pre-existing
condition. The history given to the intern is much
more objective evidence of Mrs. Marks' true condition than her testimony at trial. It is interesting
to note how clearly that evidence coincides with the
traditional degenerative disc condition. In Haynes,
21

The Diagnosis of Disc Injuries, 1 Lawyers Medical
Journal 1, 5 ( 1965) it is observed:
The history given by the patient with
a suspected protruded intervertebral lumbar
disc is one of the more important factors in
determining the accuracy of a diagnosis of
disc injury.
Usually, there has been a rather mild
or minimal injury. This injury need not be
confined to the spine itself. It can be no more
violent than stepping off a curb, a mistimed
golf swing, the picking up of a light or heavy
object, or a fit of coughing. There is, however,
usually a fairly long history prior to the patient seeing the neurosurgeon of, at least, intermittent low back ache with many episodes
of low back pain with or without radiation
of pain down either leg. Usually the preliminary history of low back pain is not diagnostic of anything beyond the fact that there are
occasional bouts of muscle spasm and usually
without radiation.
It is of course recognized that there is normally no absolute obligation on the part of the court
or jury to accept as conclusive the testimony of an
expert. However, in the instant case the expert testimony is direct and corroborated by other objective
evidence, some coming from the respondent herself.
Additionally, the respondent's testimony first support appellant's position then on redirect examination it was changed. Her testimony was inconsistent,
thus undermining its relative value. This in the face
of strong counter evidence of experts, independent22

ly corroborated, discloses the trial court erred in
reaching the conclusion it did. Finally, respondent's
unguarded statement at a point when the trial had
not directly focused on the issue, that the operation
was the result of an accident nine years before requires finding that the "back" condition for which
respondent underwent surgery in April of 1964,
predated the effective period of policy coverage.

CONCLUSION
The facts of the instant case show that respondent was not entitled to judgment. The policies
under which Mrs. Marks sought to sustain her
right to recover against appellant were obtained
under fraudulent circumstances, and respondent did
not sustain her burden to the contrary. Finally, the
evidence relating to a pre-existing condition overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that Mrs.
Marks' condition existed prior to the inception of
the policies and, therefore, was excluded from their
coverage. The judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & BALDWIN and
REX J. HANSON
Attorneys for Appellant
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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